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Abstract—Network communications and the Internet pervade
our daily activities so deeply that we strongly depend on the
availability and quality of the services they provide. For this
reason, natural and technological disasters, by affecting network
and service availability, have a potentially huge impact on our
daily lives. Ensuring adequate levels of resiliency is hence a key
issue that future network paradigms, such as 5G, need to address.
This paper provides an overview of the main avenues of research
on this topic within the context of the RECODIS COST Action.
I. INTRODUCTION
RECODIS [1] is a COST Action focusing on improving the
level of resiliency offered by current networking solutions,
as well as on devising more effective post-disaster com-
munication mechanisms. Overall, these efforts aim at better
coping with natural, technology-related, or maliciously-caused
disasters. In fact, computer-based communications represents
the key factor in our current society, enabling what is called
an inclusive digital society and changing peoples’ daily social
and economic lives. However, disasters may compromise
the networking infrastructure to the point that it becomes
unavailable or it offers degraded quality services. This can
cause cascading effects since during a disaster people may
require to communicate and receive updates on the situation or
even inform rescue teams with their location. A representative
example is the one related with one of the worst fire cases in
the Portuguese history in June 2017 [2]. The communications
among the rescue teams had been severely affected by the
fire and this had been an obstacle for efficient and effective
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Fig. 1. Focusing on reducing frequent events might lead to challenges with
increased consequences of disaster events
planning, command and execution of operations. It is a general
feeling that these communication issues had the side-effect to
increase the overall number of causalities in terms of human
life losses. Since our society is so dependent on efficient com-
munications, it is crucial to include disaster resiliency among
the main requirements for the design of the upcoming commu-
nication infrastructure. Indeed, the 5th generation of mobile
networks [3], whose commercial deployment is expected to
start in 2020, has been designed to provide ultra reliability
and low latency communications. 5G envisions a shift in the
risk from rare critical events with severe consequences (due to
a closed perspective characterizing the critical infrastructures)
to more frequent events with limited consequences, mainly
due to attacks or malfunctioning (due to the flexible and open
perspective of the programmable networks envisioned by the
5G vision), as illustrated in Figure 1. As part of the RECODIS
activities, we have investigate how 5G might satisfy such
requirements in case of disasters. The present paper provides
an overview of the main resiliency issues in present day
networks and of the main available solutions in 5G networks,
and it briefly highlights some research challenges on this topic.
II. BACKGROUND ON DISASTER-RESILIENT NETWORKING
A disaster can have considerable negative effects on the net-
working infrastructure by causing various types of failures [6].
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Adverse weather conditions can cause a decrease in commu-
nication reliability [8] (with a consequent increase of packet
loss rate) when radio frequency (RF) signals are adopted. In
fact, flashes and clouds can increase the RF signal interference
and attenuation, generating errors in received packets. More
severe disaster can cause damages at the links, which can
be temporary (possibly recoverable through software-based
mechanisms and network reconfiguration) or permanent (so
that maintenance and component substitution are required to
recover the full link availability). A disaster can damage also
the networking devices, such as hubs or routers, or even
data centers hosting the core services. Also in this case, we
can have temporary or permanent failures, and the fault can
be directly caused by the disaster (such as an earthquake
destroying the building hosting the networking equipment) or
indirectly [9] (such as severe flashing causing a blackout, and
the consequent loss of energy making the networking devices
inactive). Finally, disasters are known to cause local peaks
of traffic demand, often resulting into network saturation and
service unavailability.
In order to offer resilient solutions, network and service
providers need to ensure diversity – spatial and also in terms of
different technologies. To cope with disaster-based disruptions,
it is possible to employ various kind of techniques [7], such
as redundancy in the hardware of network devices, in the
networking topology, and resilient routing strategies, capable
of guaranteeing message delivery despite failures. Virtualiza-
tion technologies may be employed as well, to achieve spatial
distribution e.g., in edge and fog-based service architectures
and provision of resiliency-supporting approaches [18].
III. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO 5G
5G has been conceived as a key technology enabling the de-
velopment of disruptive applications, services and paradigms
such as the Internet of Things, Augmented Virtual Reality,
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, among others. All of them have
in common their reliance on wireless communications, and
specifically on high speed, reliable connectivity. The 5G
paradigm promises to properly address such requirements by
exploiting the large bandwidth available in millimiter-wave
bands (with a frequency range from 30GHz to 300GHz),
and new waveforms (whose wavelength is between 10mm to
1mm). These frequencies, by requiring [4] the use of modest-
size antennas with small beam width, facilitate the implemen-
tation of complex antenna arrays, such as those required by
Multiple Input- Multiple Output (MIMO) approaches, which
can be integrated on chip or PCB. In short, we have a data
rate of several Gbps; however, such a millimeter-wave radio
communication has very poor propagation properties. Any
natural obstacle such as rain or fog is likely to block the
link forcing to downgrade to lower frequency radio bands.
Therefore, the coverage range of base stations is lower than
the one achievable with the traditional 4G equipments. This
implies that it is needed to have high density deployments of
small cell with the consequent traffic offloading, but this may








b)  5G integrates the application 
into the communication infrastucture
Fig. 2. From the two-way interrelationship to a tight integration of application



















Fig. 3. Network slicing in 5G - both in the radio access network (RAN) and
in the core network
over, some studies, such as the one described in [5], proved
that the raining conditions negatively affect such millimeter
wavelengths by increasing the signal distortion.
The 5G paradigm implies also a shift from static network
design and management, to a dynamic model. Indeed, the very
high capacity targets of 5G will be achieved also through
adaptive (and possibly proactive) strategies which adapt the
network configuration to local transmissive conditions, and
to spatio-temporal patterns of traffic demand. A central role
in such dynamic network configuration is played by such
enabling technologies as Software Defined Networking (SDN),
Network Function Virtualization (NFV), Network Slicing, and
Cloud Radio Access Network (RAN). SDN enables pro-
grammable networks, characterized by the decoupling of the
control and user planes. NFV consists in determining how
virtualized software functions can be deployed within the
virtual machines running on common physical resources of
the core network. Network slicing (Figure 3) allows telecom
operators to define networking services dedicate to particular
classes of customers, requiring specialized quality of service.
Finally, Cloud RAN enables inter-site scheduling and cooper-
ative techniques. Bottom line, 5G is a disruptive technology
that will change the traditional networking service delivery
model (Figure 2) by integrating applications (or some of their
horizontal features such as the security-related ones) within
the programmable network, as part of the SDN or NFV
architecture.
IV. STATE-OF-THE-ART AND CHALLENGES OF
DISASTER-RESILIENT 5G
Due to the stringent reliability and availability requirements
imposed by the telecommunication networks being a vital
part of the Critical National Infrastructure, the 5G has been
designed to provide higher guarantees than the current net-
working infrastructure. The softwarization of the networks
brought by 5G is a promising way to realize those self-healing
capabilities [11] demanded to cope with the effects of disasters
(depicted in Figure 4), and to offer the necessary commu-
nications in post disaster scenarios. Indeed, a programmable
network is superior to the traditional configurable networks in
the provision of flexible and fast-failover mechanisms for the
mitigation of the effects of link or switch failures. However, in
its current design, the SDN is affected by the issue of having
a centralized controller, which represent a single point of
failure, and the possibility of encompassing robust and reliable
distributed controllers is still an open issue [12], [28], despite
some attempts to introduce a replication of controllers [13]. As
part of the RECODIS activities, a preliminary characterization
of the failure dynamics exhibited by the SDN controller has
been done by using the formalisms of the Stochastic Activity
Networks in [16].
The flexibility provided by NFV has also a great poten-
tial in providing the needed fault-tolerance level to achieve
disaster resiliency, thanks to the offered deliver agility and
flexibility. However, the problem of achieving an high avail-
ability and resiliency in NFV-based systems is far from being
considered closed, but is still open to investigation [14] and
their benchmarking are being conducted [22], [23]. In fact,
nowadays, off-the-shelf networking hardware is less reliable
that the dedicated network elements currently used for the
cellular networks (just to cite an example). The European
Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI) hosts the ETSI
Industry Specification Group for Network Functions Virtu-
alization (ETSI NFV ISG) with the intent of standardizing
the requirements and architectures for virtualization various
functions within telecoms networks. Such a group has studied
the challenges underlying the provision of high availability
and resiliency in NFV-based systems. Redundancy has been
seen as the solution for high availability by having separate
virtual machines hosting the Control Element (CE) and data
plane Forwarding Elements (FE), each of them protecting with
a master-slave replication where the replica is hosted in a
different virtual machine and can take over a failed master.
The main issue is to proper determine a placement plan for
the NFVs within the available hardware commodities and the
virtual machines running on them so as to achieve the suitable
level of availability and resiliency. Among the RECODIS
activities, a first solution to this problem based on heuristics
has been formulated and validated in [15].
Moreover, supporting different technologies may allow net-
work operators and service providers to automatically relocate
network services in case of a network failure or disaster.






















Fig. 4. Threats caused by extreme weather, natural disasters, and embedded
in the ICT system leads to escalations of disasters
is a key issue for providing dependability, still under investi-
gation [29]. In virtualized network infrastructures based on
SDN and NFV technologies, novel approaches are able to
provide service orchestrators that can automate the deployment
and dynamic re-optimization of network services [19]. Such
approaches may also provide support for achieving network
convergence, e.g., among wired Ethernet, WiFi and Free
Space Optics (FSO) technologies. As presented in [20], hybrid
solutions that consist of FSO links and back-up links in the
GHz frequency may result in higher availability. Specifically, a
prominent FSO technology under investigation in that context
is LiFi [21], which has been described as an enabling 5G
technology capable of achieving high transmission speeds,
providing even complete cellular networks. Such technologies
can be considered for deployment in areas where weather
conditions may deviate from the norm in order to provide
network availability.
The resiliency of networks is directly related also to the
safety of the physical infrastructure used for communication
networks, such as monopoles, lattice towers and guyed masts,
able to resist to the stress resulting from natural causes. The
work done in RECODIS and presented in [17] consisting
in overviewing the recent design practices for such physic
components and highlights their safety issues.
Security in the 5G is also a serious concern [24], an in
general for any communication infrastructure [10], and the
softwarization of the networking functions opens up novel
vulnerabilities to be exploited to implements attacks aiming at
compromising the overall availability of the network or even a
part of it [25]. During RECODIS, the placement of virtualized
security functions in data centers has been investigated in [26].
V. CONCLUSIONS
5G provides the upcoming network technologies that po-
tentially will radically change how the network works and is
managed. However, if it fails to provide resiliency to disasters,
it will miss the opportunity to offer the level of availability and
quality required by current and upcoming ICT infrastructures.
RECODIS is a COST Action focused on disaster resiliency,
and among its activities, it has investigated some key aspects
in 5G to provide these requirements. Some of them have been
briefly introduced in this paper.
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